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Question 
1. What is the role and impact of organised crime in healthcare systems and 
medical supply chains globally, and particularly in ODA eligible countries?  
2. What countries/regions are identified in the literature as particularly vulnerable to 
organised crime exploiting the health response to Covid-19? 
3. What lessons have been learned about how organised criminal groups/networks 
(including state embedded criminal actors) have responded to/interacted with 
past pandemics, or other humanitarian emergency responses? 
4. Is there any key learning from successful experiences of international and local 
actors in countering these risks/problems? 
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1. Summary  
‘‘HMG define serious and organised crime as individuals planning, co-ordinating and 
committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational 
networks. The main categories of serious offences covered by the term are: child sexual 
exploitation and abuse; illegal drugs; illegal firearms; fraud; money laundering and other 
economic crime; bribery and corruption; organised immigration crime; modern slavery and 
human trafficking; and cybercrime.’’ Definition from (HMG, 2018). 
 
Crime and malpractice within healthcare systems takes many forms, from front line corruption 
such as demanding cash payment for appointments or consultations, through to large scale 
misuse or misappropriation of funds in global health initiatives. Organised crime may seek to 
engage in healthcare systems in a number of ways and there is a fine line between 
maladministration and criminal activity – either of which has a negative health impact. For 
example, supply of overpriced or poor-quality counterfeit medicines endangers health; slow 
delivery of equipment delays treatments and interventions (such as testing) and thus also 
endangers public health. During outbreaks of disease the pressures from peaks in demand 
highlight weak points within a health system and these are vulnerable to exploitation by 
organised crime. 
 
Organised crime engages in activities that are directly and specifically detrimental to public 
health. Typically, this involves the production and sale of substandard fake legal goods and 
illegal drugs. The market for these products has grown and diversified with the effects of 
globalisation; and now covers essential medical pharmaceuticals, lifestyle drugs and medical 
equipment supplies. (Reynolds & McKee, 2010).  Cartwright and Baric, (2018) highlight the need 
to address the growing phenomenon of counterfeit medicines, which disproportionately 
affects developing countries because of poor systems for registration and procurement. 
When there are peaks of supply and demand such as during epidemics these present 
opportunities for already corrupt actors in healthcare systems to exploit further opportunities. 
(Rhodes, 2020)  
 
Corruption is a serious threat to global health outcomes, leading to financial waste and adverse 
health consequences. Yet, forms of corruption impacting global health are endemic worldwide in 
public and private sectors, and in developed and resource-poor settings alike. Allegations of 
misuse of funds and fraud in global health initiatives also threaten future investment. (Mackey & 
Liang, 2012) To frame this more positively, if responses to epidemics and healthcare 
emergencies are efficiently managed in a transparent manner, public confidence builds into 
adaptive behaviours and help to stabilise the crisis. Current domestic and sectorial-level 
responses are often fragmented and have been criticized as ineffective (Mackey & Liang, 2012).  
 
Corruption and criminal exploitation are global public-health challenges. Although they 
pose particular challenges for low-middle-income countries with weaker institutions and lower 
resources, they manifest in every context (Rhodes, ,2020). 
 
Overall, the literature emphasised corruption and malpractice in healthcare systems and did not 
always make clear whether criminal activity is strictly organised by groups or by individuals seizing 
opportunities as these present. Given the nature of illicit activities, data on scale and value is limited. 
Much of the evidence available is often anecdotal, based on case studies where perpetrators have 
been caught and or prosecuted and may underestimate the scale of the challenges. 
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The line between omnipresent corruption and possibly more damaging organised crime seems 
indistinct. Rather few studies were identified that report on the impact from organised crime 
groups in past pandemics, or other humanitarian emergency responses. Some of the general 
principles and risks are found illustrated by case study examples in the writing about the current 
COVID-19 pandemic. Staff in the frontline remain at high risk and agencies or NGO employers 
have a duty of care to protect. Stakeholders need to be mindful of quality issues as high demand 
brings pressure for quantity of goods and services; and of those engaged in worker supply 
chains whose conditions may be illegal and uncertain. When criminal organisations or criminal 
practice is inserted or embedded within healthcare delivery systems, resources are diverted from 
providing healthcare; with the only possible outcome being that access to health services gets 
more costly, and problematic for families. This may be ongoing during routine life health events 
such as pregnancies, births, sickness, old age and health needs of persons with disabilities – but 
is especially challenging if already stretched  health care systems are also responding to a 
medical emergency (such as a pandemic or other humanitarian urgency).  
 
• Organised-crime groups, especially where long embedded in the health sector, are 
quickly able to identify opportunities to exploit the sector. 
• Cybercrime has emerged rapidly as a risk area 
 
Gøtzsche (2014) in particular shows that the official definition of organised crime closely matches 
big pharma. The activities of the largest drug companies have in their own way corrupted 
healthcare. New products may be rushed to market based only on small scale trials; there is a 
lack of transparency and manipulation of trial data; and promotion of drugs that are harmful to the 
population (pharmaceutical companies reassured the medical community that patients would not 
become addicted to prescription opioid pain relievers, subsequently this has caused a public 
health crisis in the US),  
 
In the literature that was found the evidence rarely addressed gender issues specifically and was 
gender blind. There are some overarching statements about the impact of corruption and crime 
affecting disproportionately the poor (Kohler, 2011) which might therefore suggest that women 
are highly affected. 
 
 
2. How does organised crime work within healthcare 
systems and medical supply chains, globally and 
particularly in ODA eligible countries?  
During outbreaks of disease the pressures from peaks in demand highlight weak points 
within a health system, such as workforce shortages, poor access to medicines and corruption. 
Crime and malpractice within healthcare systems takes many forms, from front line corruption 
such as demanding cash payment for appointments or consultations, through to large scale 
misuse or misappropriation of funds in global health initiatives. Supply of overpriced or poor-
quality counterfeit medicines endangers public health, as does slow procurement and late 
delivery of equipment that delays treatment and interventions (such as testing). Organised crime 
in the form of gangs do not have to be implicitly inserted in a healthcare delivery system or 
supply chain for these to function inequitably and imperfectly since “forms of corruption impacting 
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global health are endemic worldwide, in public and private sectors, in developed and resource-
poor settings alike.” (Mackey & Liang, 2012).  
 
Public health is compromised by organised crime in many ways. Tax evasion enables money 
laundering and shrinks tax revenues, which are essential for Universal Health Care to work 
(Nishtar, 2018). Crime undermines the rule of law and since many public health measures 
depend, for their effectiveness, on the enforcement of laws, regulations and taxes all activity that 
undermines this foundation will have a negative impact on public health (Reynolds & McKee, 
2010). In any context where criminal gangs encourage a climate in which officials expect to be 
bribed, this undermines enforcement of safety regulations as well as slowing economic growth 
and prosperity. In some countries recruits to the police force pay an unofficial fee to join which 
they will subsequently recoup from bribes. As a result, activities to enforce the law shift from 
promoting safety to revenue generation. For example, it may be cheaper for food outlets to bribe 
public health officials rather than keep premises hygienic (Reynolds & McKee, 2010).  
 
More importantly organised crime engages in activities that are directly and specifically 
detrimental to public health. Typically, this involves the production and sale of substandard fake 
legal goods and illegal drugs. The market for these products has grown and diversified with the 
effects of globalisation; and now covers essential medical pharmaceuticals, lifestyle drugs and 
medical equipment supplies. Supply chains from poorly regulated and impoverished source 
regions become better integrated to their distant markets. Disparate groups of organised 
criminals are linked across their traditional territories for mutual benefit and enhanced profit; 
sophisticated linkages between production, distribution and retail functions of cooperating 
criminal networks from different cultures have exploited traditional relationships and forged new 
and far reaching ones (Reynolds & McKee, 2010). 
 
Corruption and criminal exploitation are global public-health challenges. Although they pose 
particular challenges for low-middle-income countries with weaker institutions and lower 
resources, they manifest in every context (Rhodes, ,2020). A comprehensive study covering all 
EU-28 Member States, with specific attention focused on Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Romania, investigated corruption in the health sector first in 2012 and again in 2017 
(to assess whether initial recommendations made had produced the desired changes) (Slot et al, 
2017). A key finding is that in general, perceived corruption in healthcare is correlated with 
general levels of perceived corruption (thus Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus 
are among the countries with both the highest levels of perceived general corruption and specific 
healthcare corruption, while at the other end of this continuum Scandinavian countries score well 
on both indicators) (Slot et al, 2017:10). The study identified six types of corruption: bribery in 
medical service delivery; procurement corruption; improper marketing relations; misuse of (high) 
level positions; undue reimbursement claims; fraud and embezzlement of medicines and medical 
devices. The main challenge is bribery in delivery of medical service. On average across Europe 
19% of patients reported paying bribes for preferential health treatment; this figure rises as high 
as 41% for Slovakia and 38% for Slovenia. 
 
In the US there has been a growing presence over the past 10 years of organised crime 
syndicates and street gangs engaging in healthcare fraud (Thomson Reuters, 2012). Between 
$60 billion to more than $230 billion (3% to 10% of the value of total healthcare spend) is stolen 
each year from the nation’s healthcare system through healthcare fraud, according to the 
National Healthcare Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), citing FBI information.  Criminal gangs will 
always follow the money but have engaged in healthcare fraud because it’s easy to do and is 
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lucrative with a low risk of serving jail time (as healthcare fraud is often treated as a white-collar 
crime). The American Society of Business and Behavioural Sciences estimates that 80% of 
healthcare fraud is carried out by hospitals, clinics and medical professionals primarily through 
the manipulation of the Medicare and Medicaid coding system (ICD10Watch, Feb. 9, 2012 cited 
in Thomson Reuters, 2012). The remaining 20% operated by organised crime syndicates and 
gangs far exceeds in monetary value their operations in illegal drugs and prostitution (Thomson 
Reuters, 2012: 5). 
 
Illicit trade in pharmaceuticals is a persistent problem in the organised crime landscape. The 
trade forms part of a wider shadow economy of unregistered activities and shrinks tax revenues, 
thus compromising national revenue generation and investment in public services including 
healthcare (Nishtar, 2018).  
 
Across Europe, there is evidence that organised crime groups (OCGs) are moving away from 
trafficking in high-risk commodities, such as drugs, to engage in illicit trade in products such as 
tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals. In a case study of Romania several drivers for this are 
identified (Haenlein & Eyal, 2017). Opportunity is presented by virtue of geographic positioning, 
extensive land borders (with EU states and the non-EU source countries of Ukraine, Moldova 
and Serbia) and with a principal port (Constanta on the Black Sea) providing a hub for incoming 
goods and onward transit towards richer EU countries. Government policy itself makes the 
country vulnerable to illicit trade in pharmaceuticals. Government has capped the rates paid for 
prescription drugs; legal supplies of pharmaceuticals have shrunk as pharmaceutical companies 
have retreated. The shortage of drugs to treat chronic illnesses in particular has created 
opportunities for organised crime groups. As legal stocks have dried up demand is sustained 
from patients without the drugs they need. OCGs have been quick to exploit these gaps in 
domestic supply (Haenlein & Eyal, 2017). 
 
A legal but damaging practice within the pharmaceutical market known as parallel trade further 
aggravates shortages. ‘Parallel trade’ refers to the practice of trading products bought cheaply in 
one part of the EU and sold at higher prices in another. It is legal within the pharmaceutical 
market, but can have negative impacts: in Romania, one of Europe’s cheapest markets, many 
pharmaceutical companies send stocks abroad rather than supply the local market. The parallel 
export of vaccines is reported to have fuelled an immunisation crisis among children in Romania 
(Haenlein & Eyal, 2017:19). 
 
The inconsistent application of sanctions for illicit trade is another driver. Although existing 
legislation offers relatively stringent penalties, these are often not fully applied. The result is that 
sanctions do not act as a consistent deterrent: in many cases, the same individuals return to illicit 
trade following the payment of fines, often with greater knowledge of law enforcement techniques 
(Haenlein & Eyal, 2017). Part of the problem in tackling this illegal trade is that reliable data on 
the volume of counterfeit and unlicensed pharmaceutical products sold through illegal distribution 
channels is lacking. In Romania and in other countries, an obstacle to the production of official 
statistics lies in disagreement over definitions, particularly over what constitutes ‘illicit’, and what 
constitutes a ‘pharmaceutical product’ or ‘medicine’. Most problematic is a lack of information 
concerning whether the threat is growing more or less severe, and the limited instruction this 
provides to those designing strategic responses. (Haenlein & Eyal, 2017:18) 
 
Aside from problems of the volume of this trade that is not captured by national audit and 
taxation systems is the impact for those employed in production and the individuals using the 
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products. Producers of counterfeit drugs benefit financially by substituting for high-cost 
ingredients, ignoring quality control processes, and also through the non-observance of 
environmental and employee protection, and taxation requirements. Some counterfeit drugs 
contain inadequate amounts (or none) of active ingredient (Reynolds & McKee, 2010) leading to 
treatment failures or resistance. Counterfeit drugs are believed to play a key role in the 
emergence of resistance to anti-malarials in South East Asia (Delacollette, 2009 cited in 
Reynolds & McKee 2010). Other products can instead contain too much active ingredient, as has 
been reported with counterfeit corticosteroids and oestrogens, posing a risk of over-dosage 
(Delval et al 2008 cited in Reynolds & McKee 2010). Many counterfeit drugs are identical to the 
branded versions, in packaging and appearance with their provenance faked. The impotency of 
these counterfeit drugs has subsequently caused confusion and mistrust over the use of generic 
drug formulations – which should be a positive lower cost public health measure available to 
health ministries. 
 
Cartwright and Baric, (2018) highlight the need to address the growing phenomenon of 
counterfeit medicines, which disproportionately affects developing countries with this 
worldwide market worth up to US$200 billion. Counterfeit medicines put people’s lives at risk, 
finance criminal groups and cause profound public health challenges. Their existence and growth 
in supply necessarily undermines achieving Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) which 
places significant emphasis on populations’ health, and in sub-target 3.8 specifies access ‘to 
safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’. 
 
According to World Health Organization (WHO) statistics, 42% of detected cases of substandard 
or falsified pharmaceuticals occurred in Africa (Cartwright and Baric, 2018: 2). The continent is 
an easy target for counterfeiters. A higher level of reporting of medical counterfeiting crime in 
wealthier countries obscures that the penetration of counterfeit pharmaceuticals is actually much 
greater in the developing world. A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
estimates that poorer countries experience about 30% penetration, as opposed to less than 1% 
in the developed world (Cartwright and Baric, 2018: 2). 
 
Pharmaceutical companies and drug/vaccine trials 
In an interesting comparison, widely referenced, Gøtzsche (2014) shows that the official 
definition of organised crime closely matches the activities of the largest drug companies and 
demonstrates how big pharma has corrupted healthcare. He considers many of the large drug 
companies showing where they have all been convicted of marketing harmful – even fatal - 
drugs; substantial fraud; price manipulation; and concealment of evidence. Frequently drug and 
medical companies organise trials in the best populations and comparison groups to 
demonstrate their efficacy; they control the data, do the analyses in-house, and employ 
professional writers to write the papers. Outcomes are selected to suit the company’s marketing 
needs and demonstrate the greatest differences, rather than the most important outcomes for 
patients. Trials with negative results are buried and not published. The billions of dollars in fines 
levied against companies for these offences are modest in comparison to the profits they 
continue to make, so these convictions are merely the cost of doing business. These changes 
have occurred primarily in the United States but are echoed in the rest of the world. 
For example in response to COVID-19 the UK market has been quickly flooded with swab tests 
(to detect the virus) and antibody tests to confirm prior infection. These are cheaper and quicker 
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to produce than a vaccine and have been rushed to market despite serious concerns about their 
accuracy. Swab and antibody tests (produced by Roche and by Abbott) have been released on 
the back of corporate press releases (published in the media rather than scientific journals) and 
have used trials in extremely small samples on which to publicise 100% accuracy. (BBC: More or 
Less, 10 June, 2020). 
 
Rhodes (2020) also argues that when there are peaks of supply and demand such as during 
epidemics these present opportunities for already corrupt actors in healthcare systems to exploit 
further opportunities. There are insufficiencies in the processes for vaccine development: 
publication rates of clinical study results is notoriously low, particularly for public funded research 
institutions (Mapping unreported drug trials, 2019 cited in Rhodes, 2020). Privately funded trials 
have a better publication rate but their reports are known to be full of redacted text to protect 
commercially sensitive data; and the data itself can be manipulated to produce favourable results 
(Moynihan et al, 2019 cited in Rhodes, 2020) Vaccine development suffers from a weak appetite 
from pharmaceutical companies due to low financial incentives, therefore it’s imperative that 
clinical trials are published in their entirety to support scientific innovation. The development of a 
vaccine for COVID-19 must be a transparent and collaborative effort, not a secret competition 
(Rhodes, 2020). 
 
In the absence of a means of prevention there is an interim need for a reliable treatment regime 
but avoiding needlessly expensive or ‘snake oil’ remedies. During the swine flu outbreak over 
$18 billion USD was spent in stockpiling Tamiflu. However, a scientifically rigorous review of all 
clinical data (which involved 4 years of protracted efforts to even get all the information from the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, Roche) suggested that Tamiflu was no more useful than 
paracetamol in treating swine flu due to safety and efficacy concerns. Galvao et al (cited in 
Rhodes, 2020) concluded that the quality of the evidence combined with a lack of knowledge 
about the safety of amantadine and the limited benefits of rimantadine, do not indicate that 
amantadine and rimantadine compared to control (placebo or paracetamol) could be useful in 
preventing, treating and shortening the duration of influenza A (HINI swine flu) in children and the 
elderly. The rapid announcement of the withdrawal of Hydroxychloroquine from the UK Recovery 
Trial run by the University of Oxford, that was able to test the drug in large numbers of people in 
a thorough clinical trial, helped to re-correct global attention after being promoted by Donald 
Trump despite only weak evidence from small-scale studies in China and France. (BBC, June 
2020). 
 
The undeniable need for a treatment for COVID-19 should not override the need for total 
transparency in any studies and rigorous analysis to ensure a treatment is indeed effective and 
avoid further waste of taxpayers’ money to the benefit of drug companies (Rhodes, 2020). 
 
3. What countries/regions are identified in the literature as 
particularly vulnerable to organised crime exploiting the 
health response to Covid-19? 
The analysis above shows that no country is exempt from the risks of low-level corruption or 
serious organised crime within its healthcare system. Corruption already weakens the daily 
functioning of health systems, and during an outbreak this only worsens in procurement, in 
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diversion of funds, allocation of resources, and individual-level corruption with bribes paid for 
preferential medical treatment or for the ability to flout quarantine restrictions (Rhodes, N.,2020). 
Chronic underfunding due to fraud, corruption and eroded capacity will make the struggles of 
any given healthcare sector even more significant, including its ability to respond effectively to a 
health crisis. With the COVID pandemic, rising demand and limited resources create the perfect 
conditions for corruption to worsen (GI-TOC, 2020: 7).  
 
Kohler (2011) in a wide-ranging analysis commissioned by UNDP explains why the health sector 
is prone to corruption, provides examples of instances of corruption in the health sector, and 
discusses select diagnostics and anti-corruption interventions. Corruption is a threat in the health 
sector, with common corrupt practices in the health sector identified (Kohler, 2011) include 
absenteeism, theft of medical supplies, informal payments, fraud, weak regulatory procedures, 
opaque and improperly designed procurement procedures, diversion of supplies in the 
distribution system for private gains and embezzlement of health care funds. Each of these 
practices alone represents a major challenge in many developing countries.  
Several quantitative and qualitative studies highlight the fact that the burden of corruption in the 
health sector impacts the poor most heavily, given their limited access to resources (Kohler, 
2011:6). Poor women, for example, may not get critical health care services simply because they 
are unable to pay informal fees: a recent study by Amnesty International on maternal health in 
Burkina Faso found that one of the primary causes of the deaths of thousands of pregnant 
women annually (including during childbirth) is due to corruption by health professionals. Further 
evidence from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that corruption has a significant, 
negative effect on health indicators such as infant and child mortality, even after adjusting for 
income, female education, health spending, and level of urbanization. Corruption lowers the 
immunization rate of children and discourages the use of public health clinics. In many countries, 
its pervasiveness impedes improvement in health outcomes and therefore is a serious barrier to 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Kohler, 2011:6) 
Set upon this foundation of greater or lesser corruption, mismanagement, or poor accountability 
the opportunities for corruption and organised group crime within the health sector increase in 
the context of the current pandemic. A recent policy brief (GI-TOC, 2020) suggests that although 
the COVID 19 pandemic has reduced some organised crime activities (burglary, human 
trafficking for example) at the same time it is providing opportunities for new ones. Criminal 
groups have exploited confusion and uncertainty to take advantage of new demand for illicit 
goods and services and it is anticipated that this opportunism will emerge further as the crisis 
unfolds (GI-TOC, 2020: 2). In countries where organised-crime groups have infiltrated health 
systems, life-saving resources are diverted and abused for criminal gain, weakening the 
response of states to the health emergency when it is most needed. 
 
Drawing from information provided by a transnational network of partners and from a review of 
press reporting, this policy brief determines major ways in which the pandemic will have 
implications for organised crime (and associated illegal market activity). Two trends relate to 
overall changes within the wider illicit market, but two others identify specific markets closely 
linked to changes in policy and behaviour related to the pandemic itself (GI-TOC, 2020). The key 
trends are: 
• Some organised-crime activities have been constrained by social distancing measures 
and travel restrictions and will take time to reconstitute themselves. 
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• As the attention of police forces and policymakers is diverted elsewhere, some criminal 
groups have quickly used this opportunity to scale up their activities. 
• Organised-crime groups, some long embedded in the health sector, have quickly 
identified opportunities to exploit the sector. 
• Cybercrime has emerged rapidly as a risk area that could have long-term implications 
for the growth of criminal markets (and there is early evidence of this in health supply 
chains and pharmaceuticals). 
 
The health sector is an obvious target for organised crime; with the demand for information and 
medical supplies driven by the pandemic. Substandard and illegally diverted pharmaceuticals are 
already among the most pressing illegal trade problems across the world. The pre-existing 
public-health threat targets disproportionately the most vulnerable: those who are sick and poor. 
Selling vulnerable people substandard and ineffective drugs can worsen the condition of sick 
individuals, hinder accurate diagnoses, accelerate the spread of communicable diseases, 
increase drug resistance, reduce the confidence that people have in their health institutions, and 
ultimately kill people. (GI-TOC, 2020: 7). Since the start of the pandemic sales of counterfeit 
medical products have surged, as have incidents of smuggling and theft of medical supplies. In 
the online world, which – for those confined to their homes has become the major means of 
interacting with the outside world – scams have proliferated as criminals exploit fear, and trust in 
institutions, to defraud people (GI-TOC, 2020: 6). Organised groups also exploit levels of fear 
and ignorance such as those traders based in China and Laos that have been marketing rhino 
horn products as ‘cures’ for coronavirus. (GI-TOC, 2020: 6) 
 
When demand is far more than official supplies, markets for substitutes expand and quality is 
often not controlled. Early in the pandemic the Kenyan police raided and closed down shops 
allegedly selling fake coronavirus testing kits (Aljazeera, March, 2020).  
 
The Bosnia-Croat Federation government was prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic to relax 
public procurement statutes and allow purchases of medical equipment through direct bargaining 
with suppliers rather than via public tender. Consequently, a raspberry processing firm, with no 
license to import medical equipment was then recruited by the Federal Department of Civilian 
Protection (FUCZ) to procure 100 ventilators for care of COVID-19 patients. These came from 
China for $5.84 million. During the subsequent prosecution medical experts said the ventilators 
were of a type for use in medical transport rather than intensive care units; they found did not 
meet even a minimum of necessary characteristics for treatment of COVID-19 patients; it was not 
advisable to use them in intensive-care units and the price paid for the machines had been 
inflated (Reuters, 2020). 
 
Access to medical care may be distorted with bribes paid for preferential medical treatment or to 
flout quarantine restrictions (Kohler 2011). In a context where corruption and influence are 
already a part of health systems, organised groups can build from established networks, 
establishing long-term influence /patronage. For example, in a series of interviews with four 
leading figures in Italy’s fight against the mafia, (Nazzarro, 2020) highlights key points from a 
virtual roundtable, about how the mafia is repositioning itself during the pandemic. Mafia pursuit 
of opportunity and finance from within the health sector is longstanding; the mafia have long 
captured contracts in the public-health sector. More recently, mafia groups have also turned their 
attention to the pharmaceutical industry. The lure is the sale of medical products, and also the 
potential opportunity to influence the appointment of medical practitioners. Over time any 
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‘dismantling’ of the idea of a state-guaranteed, universal public health system, matches the 
mafia’s desire to invest in private companies that work alongside, and substitute for public 
providers. 
 
Subsequently Italy has suffered one of the highest numbers of COVID-19-related deaths, where 
the pandemic is having a significant impact on the country’s economy and social fabric. Business 
owners and workers alike have been deeply affected by the lockdown. An estimated 3.3 million 
workers engaged in the country’s vast informal economy – which has an estimated value of up to 
€211 billion – are effectively excluded from government financial support. Italy’s mafia groups 
have, in response, sought to consolidate their social support by distributing food for free in the 
community. at times where state authority is perceived to be weaker the mafia like to portray 
themselves as having reassuring qualities; to become almost like a benefactor – they behave like 
the Red Cross – for which a certain portion of society is grateful. And they will remember it at the 
ballot box. Money lending to local businesses, that fear they might not otherwise survive through 
legal credit channels alone, is less benevolent.  Beginning with low interest rates and turning to 
interest at unreasonably high rates (usury) the mafia achieves their end goal that is to take over 
the business and use it to for money laundering (Nazzarro, 2020). 
 
Peaks in demand may worsen labour conditions, impacting on the poorest. The coronavirus 
crisis has created huge demand for PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) and this has been to 
the detriment of migrant labour. For example, a major part of the world’s medical gloves are 
made in Malaysia and Thailand. In these upper middle-income countries, the work is done by 
migrants from poorer countries in Asia as local people are unwilling to take on jobs they consider 
to be dangerous, dirty or difficult. Companies exploit migrants from poorer countries (men from 
Nepal and Bangladesh and women from Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam) to work excessive 
hours for minimum reward. This despite share prices increasing as global demand for disposable 
gloves has rocketed so that shareholders and company executives will gain substantially from 
the crisis (Tribune, 2020). 
 
The policy brief, developed by practitioners (GI-TOC, 2020) flags up clear risks of growth in 
cybercrime during epidemics, when the attention of responsible authorities is diverted, or new 
niche markets emerge. Janjeva (2020) highlights the risks from social isolation and heavy 
reliance on digital information, along with a desire for reassurance and support. There is a new 
and growing target population for on-line fraudsters who have adjusted scams to prey upon these 
peoples’ fears. One prominent category of scams concerns the offer of non-existent or faulty 
products. Action Fraud report receiving many reports related to online shopping scams where 
people have ordered protective gear that has not arrived. As demand continues to outstrip local 
supply in goods like masks, gloves and hand sanitiser, people are increasingly turning to the 
online marketplace to fulfil their needs. With this criminal activity amplifies. For example, the UK’s 
national reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime (Action Fraud) reported (20 March) figures 
which show that coronavirus-related fraud reports have increased fourfold in March compared to 
February (Janjeva, 2020). 
 
In contexts and countries where the healthcare system is already weak this undermines 
responses to epidemics and health crises. Healthcare delivery systems may already be 
chronically underfunded; poorly staffed; ineffectually managed with ample opportunities for 
corruption and influence. In such cases the weak healthcare system is likely to aggravate the 
impact of an epidemic. Often factors as basic as the lack of clear water and adequate sanitation 
already compromise the health situation. By their own process of self-assessment that is driven 
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by the African Peer Review Mechanism and Country Review Reports some countries are well 
positioned to illustrate and understand how problems in their health sectors, coupled with poor 
governance and corruption, can exacerbate outbreaks like the coronavirus and Ebola (allAfrica, 
2020). 
 
For example, Sierra Leone peer reviewed in 2012 before the Ebola epidemic of 2014 already 
reported shortage of clean water and poor sanitation as major factors contributing to the poor 
health situation. And the Ministry of Health and Sanitation was identified by a National Public 
Perception Survey (2010) as the most corrupt ministry in the country. 
 
For the case of Tanzania, peer reviewed in 2013 although the Government aims to restore free 
health services, health reforms are overly dependent on donor funding with access still a major 
challenge.  The situation is aggravated by high costs and poor health services. There are 
medical staff shortages, inadequate facilities, and a lack of medicines, especially in rural areas 
(allAfrica, 2020). In such contexts there is legitimate concern that these pre-existing conditions 
will only make the impact of any epidemic greater than it need become; corruption and criminal 
practices further amplify this risk.  
4. Lessons from past pandemics 
Rather few studies were identified on the impact from organised crime groups in past pandemics, 
or other humanitarian emergency responses. In one paper published as part of the ALNAP1 
Lessons Paper series, Grünewald & Maury (2020) review the lessons from a number of health 
crises and epidemics. Corruption is only mentioned once in relation to pressures around 
organising mass vaccination programmes, where there are many stakeholders and interests. The 
situation on the ground sometimes makes achieving proper management and accountability 
difficult (Grünewald & Maury, 2020:23). This review identifies 11 key lessons for epidemic 
preparedness and responses – none touch on corruption or involvement of criminal groups. 
In contrast procurement underpins the World Bank’s response to the pandemic (Sharma, 2020) 
and the Bank focuses clearly on procurement issues – both goods and services. The state of the 
market for supplies and the workforce that are vital to contain and combat the epidemic in 
questions are always a challenge. Goods and services are not readily available, and as demand 
across the globe far exceeds the supply there is price inflation. The opportunities for price 
manipulation, poor quality or ineffective equipment and other fraud are illustrated above (Section 
3). The rationale for this focus is therefore clear.   
 
Under normal circumstances, the global market regulates itself. In such an unprecedented 
situation, there is neither an automatic correction of the markets nor any global regulation in 
place to address market failures and this creates openings for corruption or illicit practices. The 
same goes for procurement of consultancy services to raise public awareness and to develop 
laboratory and medical protocols, especially if many hospitals lack capacity to manage the 
number of cases and the internal organisation needed to prevent intra-hospital infection. 
Technical support services are equally open to maladministration or corruption. A failure of 
oversight, that may lapse during a crisis, is a major risk to protection and effective treatments. 
 
1 A global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics, 
networks and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve response to humanitarian crises 
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Kohler’s analysis (2011) of the corruption risks in the health sector also remain valid during an 
epidemic and may become amplified.  Weak points around which recommendations and case 
study good practice examples are given in this Methods and Tools Guidance are: 
• Corruption among health care providers such as physicians, nurses and pharmacists. 
Petty corruption associated with health providers includes absenteeism (not showing up 
for work yet claiming a salary), theft (of medical supplies or pharmaceuticals), and 
demand for informal payments for services that are supposed to be free. Petty corruption 
of this sort has a direct impact on the poor by denying them access to services and 
thereby jeopardising their health. 
• Role of government in the regulation of the pharmaceutical market and selection of 
drugs. A transparent selection process involves the registration and market authorisation 
of drugs also deciding which drugs are included in a state sector healthcare service and 
are therefore eligible for reimbursement policies. This drug registration and market 
authorisation are the responsibility of national drug agencies. In contexts where these 
agencies are poorly funded and have limited staff and institutional capacity; and if the 
legislative and regulatory environments are weak then there is room for a lack of 
transparency and accountability in the processes. Government officials may deliberately 
delay the registration process to solicit an illegal payment or favour another supplier; 
suppliers may bribe government officials to register their drugs without the requisite 
information; prices may be unfairly fixed. Any of these situations can create openings in 
the market for counterfeit and substandard medicines (Kohler, 2011: 27). There is no clear 
evidence about whether procurement at the national level of government is less prone to 
corruption than a decentralised approach; but in either case how the procurement process 
is set up matters. (Kohler, 2011: 28). 
• Distribution and Storage systems that limit diversion of drugs are vital. since drugs are 
a substantial part of healthcare budgets so all losses increases health care costs. In an 
epidemic response this is also the case.  
• Health budgets may be subject to corruption if oversight is lacking. 
• Anti-corruption interventions include procurement audits, community oversight and 
monitoring, community social cards and social audits, online publication of all 
procurement processes, more rigorous terms for NGO and contract awards, and 
procurement audits. (Kohler, 2011:31). Others also stress that combating corruption and 
crime in healthcare systems should necessarily implicate civil society actors (see below).  
5. Lessons for countering crime in healthcare systems 
Fighting corruption requires action at many levels (Nishtar, 2018). “Treasuries, finance ministries 
and dedicated anti-corruption agencies alike, must focus on prevention, detection and 
enforcement. Good governance needs to be better incentivised. Making financial systems more 
transparent will be critical to curbing health corruption. It is not just government and business that 
have roles to play in achieving this; civil society, the media and patients must also demand 
accountability.” 
Cockayne (2017) cautions that socioeconomic, environmental and technological changes will 
create new challenges for developing states. With some risk of a significantly expanded role for 
organised crime in governance and the rise of ‘crooked states’ and crooked governance more 
broadly. Amongst others cyber-threats, unsafe supply-chains and unregulated financial systems 
will create new risks and vulnerabilities. States may increasingly struggle to provide protection 
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and services for their population and without the protection of the state in spaces such as 
cyberspace or new financial markets, people will look elsewhere. In some cases, businesses, 
private actors or civil society may emerge to address risk and provide insurance against 
insecurity. But in others, criminal actors will step in and they may corrupt formal and legitimate 
institutions, businesses and markets, bending them away from their stated purpose.  
Preventing and reducing the role of criminal groups in governance will require development 
policies that help states, working with civil society and legitimate businesses, provide protection 
and reduce vulnerabilities. Key policy implications include:  
• Using social protection policies to address vulnerabilities and reduce demand for criminal 
protection. This may include economic livelihood programming, interventions designed to 
ensure the equitable distribution of resources, and investment in social service provision 
or infrastructure development.  
• Minimizing the demand for criminal protection created by shifts in the labour market, 
through programming that encourages economic resilience, job training initiatives and 
alternative forms of livelihood provision. 
• Exploring how anti-corruption interventions can be used to protect state institutions 
against organised crime, for example through strategic interventions to address the links 
between corruption and political finance and working out which interventions shift social 
norms to promote resilience to organised crime.  
• Strengthening the counter-organised crime role played by global finance in development 
outcomes, improving financial transparency and global coordination to reduce 
opportunities for corruption and illicit financial flows 
 
This review was able to identify longstanding debate about addressing problems of long-term 
systemic issues in healthcare delivery and procurement systems. There is a variety of 
approaches and recommendations about improving health systems (public sector finance 
programmes; access to free equitable systems of care; governance and anti-corruption 
programmes) for example. In the context of the COVID pandemic the Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organised Crime recommends that health stakeholders: ‘Focus strongly now on 
organised criminal activity in the wider health sector, in particular in relation to procurement and 
the provision of counterfeit medical supplies. Publicly counter attempts by criminal entrepreneurs 
to develop new markets linked to the pandemic, such as the advertising of wildlife products and 
other cures. The media and civil-society groups have an important role to play here in raising 
awareness.’ (GI-TOC, 2020:20) 
 
Reitano & Hunter (2018) similarly allocate responsibility to development actors for understanding 
how organised crime affects their objectives. It is not reasonable to assume that law enforcement 
alone will solve the problems of crime. Where this is visible and presents challenges that mitigate 
the impact of development, development assessments now must include organised crime 
analysis. This should be the case whether they focus on public health and social services or 
other domains such as conflict, democracy, governance and economic growth (Reitano & Hunter 
2018: 29). Noting that it may become challenging for external actors to raise development threats 
posed by organised crime as a local priority, or to gain traction at a community level, when 
considering the extent to which local communities are involved in the trade; that it is not 
stigmatised as a crime domestically; or that it is a longstanding practice that has been amplified 
and accelerated by globalisation. Even in instances where individuals or the community may look 
unfavourably on organised crime, they may see little incentive and much risk in speaking out. 
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Activists and journalists have paid high prices for fighting organised crime or a culture of impunity 
that is sanctioned or reinforced by the state. If the community response is to mobilise, efforts 
must be made to protect those with the courage to make their voices heard and to be visible 
sources of resistance. Certain safety nets must be put in place, such as asylum when activists 
are targeted by criminals, or business or political elites (Reitano & Hunter 2018: 30). 
 
Limited research that covers only two cases and two sectors, suggests that anti-corruption 
approaches which disrupt corruption patterns and networks can work up to a point (Marquette, 
2018). In Uganda, a targeted anti-bribery intervention seems to have reduced bribery in the 
health sector with bribery patterns directly affected by the Health Monitoring Unit’s push to name 
and shame offenders. In contrast to this focused targeting, in South Africa an impressive 
reduction (15%) in police-related bribery appears to have been localised to Limpopo province as 
a ‘benign side effect’ of a wider anti-corruption intervention and work to improve service delivery. 
In other provinces the maximum reduction in police-related bribery was only 4% from the same 
interventions. The interpretation of this data suggests that Limpopo police were unsure if they 
were among the targets of the high-profile anti-corruption activities, so avoided asking for bribes 
for fear of being caught. In both cases, interventions disrupted corruption patterns by making it 
more difficult, unacceptable or undesirable for front-line workers to seek bribes. Although neither 
of these cases seems to have been a complete ‘success’, and it is unclear how long the lower 
bribery rates will last. In Uganda, there were unintended negative consequences with lower 
morale among health workers, lower citizen trust in the sector. Informal payments at times to 
provide ways to work around structural flaws in the health system like chronic lack of supplies or 
low salaries.  
 
In Europe corruption in the healthcare system is also a challenge (Slot, 2017) and there have 
been documented differences between Member States in terms of their efforts as well as their 
successes, in fighting this type of corruption. For example, much progress was made in Poland 
as the result of a combination of awareness raising campaigns, active prosecution of physicians, 
and media coverage of these cases. In Greece, on the other hand, the situation has worsened 
due to the economic downturn. This study on repetition draws 13 key conclusions about avenues 
to combat corruption in healthcare. These are: 
 
1. Convictions of (high-profile) corruption cases have a deterrent and norm setting effect 
especially when a good number of cases are brought to court and are followed by sustained 
political action. 
 
2. Centralisation of procurement is a method to lower the risks of corruption. may also be 
important to have public registries in place and to introduce transparency increasing 
measures, otherwise centralised procurement may face more risks 
 
3. Central procurement systems can become vulnerable as targets for lobbyists and more 
politically inspired types of corruption although it was noted that decentralised systems may 
also be prone to lobbying and politically inspired corruption.  
 
4. Bribery in medical service delivery cannot be contested with only targeted policies against the 
phenomenon as such, but need to be supplemented with a variety of accompanying 
(structural) measures such as changes in the healthcare system, and changes in attitudes 
towards corrupt practices. 
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5. Raising salaries does not have a significant preventive effect on reducing bribery in medical 
service delivery. Although low salaries are a problem, raising salaries cannot be a standalone 
measure. For example, active prosecution and public awareness of the unethical aspects are 
also needed. 
 
6. There is more than one root cause of corruption in healthcare. Most frequently mentioned are: 
general acceptance of corruption, ineffective managerial structures, inappropriate financing 
mechanisms, and unequal allocation of resources. Insufficient healthcare capacity and 
insufficient funding for independent medical research also causes for corruption. 
 
7. The introduction of transparent waiting lists has a positive effect on reducing healthcare 
bribery, though the lists should be frequently updated, ensuring up to date information about 
and for patients. 
 
8. Prescription of generics instead of branded pharmaceutical products has a positive effect on 
reducing healthcare bribery. 
 
9. Self-regulation between the industry and healthcare providers is needed to fight corruption in 
healthcare. On its own this may be insufficient such that it would be beneficial if initiatives 
between the industry and the healthcare provider were embedded in legislation to strengthen 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
10. Self-regulation among stakeholders (such as within the pharmaceutical industry or among 
physicians) is needed to fight corruption in healthcare and incentives for cooperation are 
important for self-regulation to be effective. 
 
11. Awareness raising campaigns and fraud and corruption reporting hotlines are an effective 
instrument to fight corruption in healthcare. On their own hotlines cannot be effective in 
reducing corruption but need to be combined with other measures and legislation. 
 
12. Government should play an active role in creating transparency in the relations between the 
industry and healthcare providers. When governments do not show sufficient willingness to 
fight corruption in general this undermines their stance and causes scepticism. 
 
13. Active – independent – media involvement and pressure from civil society watchdogs are 
essential to fight corruption in healthcare. 
 
Kohler (2011) has earlier also highlighted a set of lessons that may assist any stakeholder (policy 
makers, development practitioners, citizens, etc.) to design anti-corruption interventions in the 
health sector. 
Lesson one. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to mitigating corruption in the health sector. 
Practitioners need to give careful attention as to what potential strategy or strategies would work 
most effectively in view of the specific risks identified by use of diagnostics.  
Lesson two. More than one anti-corruption intervention should be employed to deal with one 
risk. For example, wage increases may help to curb the likelihood of absenteeism, but they are 
likely to be more effective when there are systems in place to document absentee rates and 
when sanctions for absence are imposed.  
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Lesson three. Prioritization is key: governments and others involved in health projects and 
programming should prioritize areas of the health system that are most susceptible to corruption 
and implement appropriate interventions. Often even ‘low hanging fruit’ can produce significant 
anti-corruption impacts. For example, the act of posting medical supply and pharmaceutical 
product pricing can help deter price gouging. The identification of priority areas is particularly 
important when resources are scare.  
Lesson four. It is important to work with other sectors. Corruption cannot be curbed in the health 
sector without the involvement of other critical sectors, such as infrastructure and finance.  
Lesson five. Health policy goals should include anti-corruption considerations. Investments in 
health may be wasted unless anti-corruption strategies are built into all health projects. 
Preventative interventions can protect investments made.  
Lesson six. Prevention is the best strategy: therefore, it is best not to wait for corruption to 
happen before beginning to deal with it. One of the biggest failings in the health sector is the 
implementation of anti-corruption interventions only after corruption is suspected or confirmed. 
Regular monitoring of the health sector for discrepancies in standards is vital. 
Lesson seven. Numerous empirical diagnostic tools should be employed. Given the complexity 
of the health sector, more than one diagnostic tool may be of value to ensure accurate 
information. This also requires proper measuring and re-measuring. Regular ‘check-ups’ can 
measure how effectively anti-corruption strategies are working in a given point in the health care 
system.  
Lesson eight. Partners with experience in implementing anti-corruption strategies and tactics 
should be identified and contacted for technical support. This study has identified a number of 
NGOs, international development institutions, research groups and experts involved in 
implementing anticorruption strategies and tactics in the health sector.  
Lesson nine. Broad participation in health policy and planning helps. Involving NGOs, citizens 
and designated experts in health budgeting, monitoring, and consulting, as a few examples, can 
help heighten transparency and lessen the likelihood of corruption.  
Lesson ten. Good behaviour should be rewarded, and bad behaviour punished. This can be 
done by setting up appropriate incentive structures that help promote adherence to good 
behaviour, such as performance-based financing. It is also important to sanction those 
individuals who are engaged in corrupt activities where possible. This sends an important 
message that corruption is not tolerated. 
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